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Without attempting to cover all the legal problems connected with freedom of
information in the United Nations, this article will be mainly devoted to those
presented by Article 17 of the Covenant on Human Rights while the author was
participating in its formulation.
The promotion of fundamental human rights is repeatedly mentioned in the
Charter as one of the chief purposes and functions of the United Nations,1 and the
Commission on Human Rights is, apart from the still unorganized Military Staff
Committee, the only body lower than the Councils which is specifically required
by the Charter. 2 The right to freedom of information, which corresponds to
"freedom of speech and of the press" under the First Amendment in our Constitution, was made the object of special attention when the General Assembly in December 1946 called the International Conference on Freedom of Information. The
Commission on Human Rights early in 1947 set up a Sub-Commission on Freedom
of Information and of the Press. This devoted most of its first session, in May-June
1947, to planning the organization of the ConferenceY Soon afterwards, the Economic and Social Council settled that the Conference should meet at Geneva on
March 23, 1948.
The Commission on Human Rights, at its second session, in December 1947 at
Geneva, began drafting the International Covenant on Human Rights, and blocked
out articles dealing respectively with most of the fundamental rights intended
to be protected.4 However, it decided not to elaborate a final text of Article 17 on
freedom of information until it had before it the views of the Sub-Commission and
the Geneva Conference.5 Accordingly, the Commission referred to the Sub-Commission for its consideration two tentative drafts of Article 17, which had been laid
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before the Commission, one by its Working Group on the Covenant, the other by
the Representative of the United States. (These are reprinted in Appendix I.)
The Sub-Commission began its second session at Lake Success on January 19,
1948, and gave the greater portion of its time to Article 17 of the Covenant. This
body differs from the Commission on Human Rights in not being composed of
representatives of governments. The twelve members of the Sub-Commission are
appointed as experts from twelve different countries. Although each member's
government must approve his serving, he does not act under orders from that
government but is, for the time being, an official of the United Nations. He receives
much help from the permanent officials of his own State Department or Foreign
Office, and naturally pays considerable respect to the wishes of his government.
Otherwise his work might come to naught when it is reviewed by bodies higher up
in which his government is directly represented, like the Commission on Human
Rights or the Economic and Social Council. In the end, however, he decides for himself what is best in the interest of the United Nations. This power of independent
judgment possessed by the members of the Sub-Commission produced a strong
sense of common responsibility. Most of us had been at the first session and so became accustomed to working together. We met each other often in pairs or small
groups at lunch at Lake Success and at dinner in New York, where troublesome
matters of phraseology were sometimes straightened out during the evening. Because
of the general mastery of English, pieced out by tolerable French, linguistic barriers
hardly existed. Simultaneous translation facilitated the exchange of views at the conference table. Several members had legal training, relevant to the task of drafting
part of a treaty, including the chairman, G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart (Netherlands).
He is now chief editor of a large Amsterdam newspaper. The members who were
not lawyers were experienced in journalism. Regardless of some sharp differences
of opinion the Sub-Commission was an admirable and enjoyable working unit.
As the starting point for the Covenant article, a choice was soon made of the
tentative text from the Working Group of the Human Rights Commission (see
Appendix I, Draft i). During most of a fortnight the Sub-Commission hammered
out the draft for Article 17 which is reprinted as Draft A in Appendix II. This,
with only one or two negative votes, it decided to recommend to the Commission on
Human Rights.'
Less than two months later, the United Nations Conference convened at Geneva
on March 23, 1948. The task of drafting Article 17 of the Covenant was referred
to Committee IV, on law and continuing machinery. The chairman, Sir Ramaswami
Mudaliar (India), is prime minister of Mysore, and the rapporteur, Fernand Dehousse (Belgium), is Professor of International Law at the University of Liege and
sits on the Commission on Human Rights. Many members of Committee IV were
lawyers, and others were government officials with lawyerlike minds. The conditions
6
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of work were different than in the Sub-Commission. At Geneva we were delegates
of our respective governments, bound to act in consultation with our co-delegates
and the permanent officials in the national group, and subject to directives cabled
from the home capital. Each nation tended to act as a separate unit. There was
little opportunity (as in the Sub-Commission) for progress through informal meetings of a few men from diverse countries who had got to know each other intimately. At sessions, instead of twelve men sitting close together around a single
table, forty or more delegates in Committee IV occupied at least half a dozen tables.
(Each of the fifty-four nations present at the Conference had the right to attend
the committee and speak, but only representatives of members of the United Nations could vote.) So one had the sense of addressing a mass meeting rather than
trying to persuade individuals. Indeed, the speaker knew that there was little use
in convincing his listeners, since the real decisions were usually not made by them
but by hundreds of people outside the room. The necessity of a long interval for
translating each speech broke the continuity of discussion, although it had the advantage of giving an opponent plenty of time to collect his thoughts for a reply.
There was no danger of blurting out the first idea that came to mind, as with
simultaneous translation. A final contrast to the atmosphere in the Sub-Commission
was caused by the intervening coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, which produced a considerable strain right through the Geneva Conference. Despite all these obstacles,
the members of Committee IV developed a notable esprit de corps. They wasted
little time on eloquent and prolonged denunciations of other countries, but "made a
noise like a lawyer" and kept steadily at work on rather tedious tasks with a common attitude toward problems of law and draftsmanship.
One significant observation at both the Sub-Commission and the Conference was
how little embarrassment arose from the differences between the law of Continental
Europe and the Anglo-American law. Lawyers were lawyers, in whichever system
they had been trained. In the area of international freedom of information, at any
rate, they understood each other and knew the same craftsmanship.
Committee IV used the Sub-Commission draft (A in Appendix II) as the basis
of work on the Covenant. It made some improvements in phraseology, and several
important changes in substance to all of which the writer found himself opposed.
Still, he felt that the conference draft should be approved in principle, leaving modifications to be made by the Commission on Human Rights. The other members
of his delegation took a different view, and the United States accordingly joined
the Soviet bloc in a minority of 7, which opposed the committee's draft in plenary
session 7 The majority adopted the work of Committee IV without change. This
conference draft for Article 17 is reprinted as Draft B in Appendix II, and has for all
practical purposes superseded the Sub-Commission draft.
' REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATES, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
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Nothing much has happened since to Article 17 of the Covenant. The Commission on Human Rights, in its third session at Lake Success in May-June 1948,
finished the Declaration on Human Rights, subsequently adopted by the General
Assembly. Article T9, on freedom of opinion and expression, continues (with minor
changes) the draft made for the Declaration by the Sub-Commission and substantially approved by the Geneva Conference. The Commission did not have time to
consider the Covenant in detail s At its recent fifth session at Lake Success in MayJune 1949, the Commission revised many articles of the Covenant, but decided to
postpone consideration of the text of Article 17 until its sixth sessiony
Meanwhile, the Drafting Committee of the Commission has been considering
three drafts, among which it has not yet made a choice. Besides the Conference
draft, Appendix II reprints a French draft (Draft C), because it probably has
strong backing and embodies a principle which was unsuccessfully urged by the
United States at the Geneva Conference. This French draft will be mentioned later
in connection with the problem of specific as against general limitations. The third
text now before the Commission comes from the Soviet Union.'0 It flatly denies
protection to freedom of speech and press when "used for war propaganda for inciting enmity among nations, racial discrimination and the dissemination of slanderous rumours." Some of the ideas in the Soviet draft bear on the problem of the
Indian Amendment, hereafter discussed.
This is the chronological framework within which the legal problems presented
themselves. Unless otherwise indicated, only the author is responsible for the
reflections which follow. There is reason to believe that some of them were shared
by other members of the Sub-Commission, but the pressure of concrete issues of
drafting was too great to allow accurate ascertainment of the extent of agreement
on the theoretical matters here discussed.
First, some problems had to be answered about the Covenant as a whole in order
to understand the effect of Article 17.
I
FOR WHAT SORT OF WORLD WOULD THE COVENANT

BE

iN FORCE?

A concept which dominated all the thinking in the Sub-Commission was that the
Covenant on Human Rights was not getting drafted for this troublous period of
settling down after a great war, but for the better years ahead. The nations are
still playing the old game of territorial aggrandizement and competing armaments
which has culminated twice in a world war. They must play the new game made
possible by the United Nations before an international guaranty of freedom of
speech and other human rights can work with the effectiveness of law. In past
treaties, nation A has occasionally promised nation B to protect the rights of citizens
' REPORT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE CoMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, June 28, 1948 (E/8oo, p.

5).

' REPORT OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, June 23, 1949 (E/1371, p.
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of B who are sojourning within the borders of A, but this is the first time in history
when it is seriously proposed that each of several nations shall obligate itself to
protect the human rights of its own citizens. A start in this direction has already
been made by the recent peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, and other nations, but
these are defeated countries, whereas the Covenant is to apply inside victorious
countries. Furthermore, the subsequent ill success of the guaranties of human rights
in these peace treaties demonstrates the futility of such international obligations unless they are to be performed in a more orderly world than now exists.
The Sub-Commission never debated the desirability of the Covenant. That was
a question for the Commission on Human Rights. The Commission had given us
a job to do and we did it. "Theirs not to reason why .. ." But it was provided in
Article 23 of the draft Covenant, as it was laid before the Sub-Commission in January 1948, that the Covenant should not come into force until two-thirds of the
members of the United Nations had acceded to its terms.'1 Obviously an enormous
change would have to take place in the attitudes of many nations toward liberty
before over thirty-five countries would be willing to bind themselves by the Covenant. A good many years would elapse before the requisite number had been
obtained. The Sub-Commission was planning Article 17 for the distant future
and could ignore present stresses and strains.
This concept that we were drafting law to operate in a r'gime of international
order and not in crises was shared, it is believed, by many members of the SubCommission. Though not made articulate at the conference table, it was constantly
felt. The concept was strengthened by Article 4, which permitted the obligations
of the Covenant to be lifted in time of war or other public emergency within a
state. 5
At the Geneva Conference, however, one sensed quite a different attitude. The
intervening Czech crisis had focused the attention of delegates on wars and threats
of wars, and on the possible need of protection from objectionable utterances within
their respective countries. A proposed provision of Article 17 frequently seemed
to evoke the question, "Would this prohibition of suppressive legislation hurt my
country now?"
Although the writer strongly believes that such a feeling should not dominate
the drafting of Article 17 or any other part of the Covenant, nevertheless so long as
" REPORT OF THE SECOND SESSION OF TM COMMISSION ON HUMAN RPG5HTS,op. cit. supra, note 4, at
35. Subsequent drafts of Article 23 in the Human Rights Commission may give the Covenant an earlier
operation; they provide that it shall come into force when-member nations have deposited their
instruments of accession with the Secretary-General. REPORT OF THE TmuD SEsSION, op. Cit.supra, note
8, at 34; REPORT oF ma FIFTH SESsION (E/1371, pp. 41, 6o). Still, if the blank is filled with a large

number, a more orderly world will be necessary before the required number of nations accede to it.
And if only a few nations can bring the Covenant into force, its effect on the promotion of human
rights is likely to be correspondingly small.
" The draft before the Sub-Commission reads: "In time of war or other public emergency, a State
may take measures derogating from its obligations under Article 2 above to the extent strictly limited
by the exigencies of the situation." A state so derogating must inform the Secretary-General of the
measures taken and the reasons therefor, and notify him when the measures cease to operate (E/6oo, pp.
30.3i). Article 4 has been modified at later sessions of the Human Rights Commission, but the privilege
of derogation remains (E/8oo, p. 16; E/1371, pp. 29, 56, 57).
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this feeling prevails, it is unwise to put Article 17 into final form. At least, that
action should be deferred until the peace treaties with Germany and Japan have been
formulated and executed and successfully carried out. For one thing, the content
of Article 17 (as will hereafter be argued) ought to depend greatly on the provisions
for its implementation which will be established by later articles of the Covenant.
No implementation provisions have yet been drafted, and the author ventures the
opinion that it is impracticable to determine the precise nature of methods for enforcing human rights inside a nation's territory while the present disturbed condition
of the world continues.
This position does not mean that work on Article 17 is now in vain. It is well
worth while for carefully chosen groups of men and women to think ahead and
write out the best possible free speech article they can make, so that it will be ready
for use when the right time arrives for its adoption by many nations. That is far
wiser than putting everything off. On the other hand, the draftsmen of today
ought to contemplate the probability that their work will have to be revised in
better times than ours. Whatever is done before the peace treaties are out of the
way should be regarded as tentative and preparatory. The final formulation of the
International Covenant on Human Rights ought not to be hurried. The most
ardent supporters of that document would be wise to wait until they can be sure
that there is a strong desire among officials and peoples to obey it. Otherwise, the
Covenant may be just a piece of paper like the Kellogg Pact. And delay does not
mean that the intervening time will be lost. Every opportunity for fruitful discussion of the provisions of any draft should be utilized. Thus their ultimate form
will be improved, and widespread familiarity with the Covenant will build up a
respect for it which will increase its prospects of effective operation when it does
eventually go into force.
II
THE COVENANT COMPARED WITH OuR OwN

BILL

OF RIGHTS

The rights protected by the various articles of the Covenant are, for the most
part, the same as those guaranteed by the first ten amendments to the United States
Constitution, which are commonly thought of as our Bill of Rights. Reflection
shows, however, that the Covenant has a very different function from these amendments. They were framed because the peoples of the states wished to restrict the
powerful central government which had just been established by the main portion
of the Constitution. The Covenant does not restrict the new central government
established at San Francisco in 1945. The United Nations has very few governmental powers, and they are too weak to need much restraining. The only genuine
parallel to our Bill of Rights' 3 is in the Charter. Article 2, paragraph 7, refusing
"s Another restriction on the United Nations is the veto power of any one of the five permanent

members of the Security Council.
Constitution.

Article 27, 3.

But it would be hard to find a parallel to this in our

The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions unsuccessfully sought to impose an even tighter
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to authorize the United Nations to intervene in "matters which are essentially

within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . ." somewhat resembles the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves to the states or to the people the powers "not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution...
The Covenant is intended to restrict the powers of the member nations which
choose to accede to it. Hence the true analogy to it will be found outside our
original Bill of Rights in the limitations on the powers of the states in the main body
of the Constitution, and in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments.
Here it is important to observe that our constitutional limitations on state powers
fall into two types-those concerning interstate and foreign matters and those concerning the relations of a state with its own citizens.
In the original Constitution, restrictions of the first type predominate. The states
are forbidden to engage in several activities which are appropriate only to the
national government. These reach across state lines and national frontiers, by their
very nature or by their immediate consequences. Many of these prohibited activities
do not concern human rights, e.g., coining money, levying import duties, etc., so only
those relevant to our purposes will be mentioned. By implication, a state may not
pass laws which burden interstate or foreign commerce.1 4 Hence it cannot interfere
with freedom of residence within the United States by preventing persons from
entering from another state.' 5 Again, the supremacy of treaties may result in protecting the fundamental rights of an alien against state interference.' 6 A provision
that might have become significant for human rights, but has been little invoked
for that purpose, is: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states."1 7 Finally, the impartial enforcement
of rights entitled to federal supervision is obtained by the establishment of United
States courts, in which citizens of different states can sue each other, an alien can
sue a citizen or vice versa, and anybody can assert claims under the Constitution or
8
an Act of Congress or a treaty.'
In the foregoing situations, there is a considerable resemblance to international
law as it was customarily regarded before the Second World War. The community
of nations stood in somewhat the same position toward separate nations as the
United States toward separate states. International courts, arbitration tribunals, and
diplomatic negotiations ordinarily concerned themselves with affairs inside a state
only when these affairs affected the subjects or the government of another state.
Not until we examine the second type of restrictions in our Constitution do we
find anything closely like the Covenant. It is noteworthy, however, as Holcombe
21 U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, §8; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. .,i(U. S. 1824).
•"Craindall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 16o (1941).
"oU. S. CoNsr. Art. VI, §2; Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796), and many subsequent decisions.
27 U. S. CoNsTr. Art. IV, §2.
'1 Id. Art. III, §2.
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points out in his useful book Human Rights in the Modern World (948), that the

Philadelphia Convention was very cautious about limiting the powers of a state
over its own citizens. Again considering only provisions protecting human rights,
we find that no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts,' and that the United States (construed to mean
Congress) shall guarantee to each state a republican form of government 2 --a power
fortunately never needed as yet. Apart from these two clauses, a state government
before the Civil War could deal as oppressively as it pleased with its own citizens.
Of course, most states already had their own constitutional guaranties against
such tyranny, but if a state chose to repeal or disregard these guaranties, the national
government could do nothing about it under the original Constitution. It was equally
powerless to interfere after the adoption of the first ten amendments in 1791. A
state might abolish freedom of the press and jury trial in criminal cases, and do
everything else which the Bill of Rights forbade the national government to do, and
yet neither Congress nor the federal courts could interfere.
Perhaps this was just as well, when we remember the difficulty with which
the young central government was established in the face of state jealousies. Chief
Justice Marshall had his hands full to maintain strictly national interests against
local opposition without also undertaking to interpose between one of the sovereign
states and some individual within its borders, merely because his human rights were
infringed. Think of the clashes which would have ensued if the Supreme Court of
i8io (in accordance with the decisions of our time) had upheld freedom of speech
by releasing a Negro convicted in a Georgia court for urging blacks to demand
the vote and had upheld freedom of religion by upsetting the centuries-old custom
of Massachusetts towns to pay the Congregational minister's salary out of taxes. It
is doubtful whether the Court would have been obeyed and whether the nation
could have withstood such strains in its early years.
Can the much weaker central government of the United Nations afford to take
on comparable tasks while it is just starting its life? Holcombe thinks not. It was
not for nearly eighty years after its foundation, he recalls, that our central government, when greatly strengthened by the Civil War, obtained the power to protect
inside the states those fundamental rights which the Covenant proposes to guarantee
within a decade after the adoption of the Charter. The Thirteenth Amendment
abolished slavery like Article 8 of the Covenant. The Fourteenth Amendment
expanded the scope of the old privileges and immunities clause and made it include
the citizens of an offending state, by providing that "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States"; but this clause, though greatly beloved by laymen who write about constitutional law, has been little invoked by lawyers." Far more important for human
19M. Art. 1, §xo.
20
1d. Art. IV, §4.
"See

Edwards v. California, supra note 15; Hague v. C. 1. "0., 307 U. S. 496 (1939).

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

553

rights is the succeeding clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. ." The
word "liberty" is now interpreted by the Supreme Court to cover all the fundamental
human rights which are protected against national action by the Bill of Rights of
i79i, and consequently safeguards them against state governments as well. In the
field of freedom of information, for instance, the prohibitions of the First Amendment are in effect applied to upset suppression under state legislation. Nevertheless,
as Holcombe emphasizes, this result was not reached until 1925,22 sixty years after
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and a hundred and forty years after
the Philadelphia Convention, when the power of the central government had become enormous in comparison with the power of the states which it thus restrains.
Holcombe's inference from our own experience is that the United Nations should,
for some time to come, follow the analogy of the first type of restrictions on the
states in our Constitution and confine its concern with human rights to those situations inside one nation which affect the interests of another nation or of the United
Nations. As to the last point, Holcombe would make over a clause from the Fourteenth Amendment and have a treaty agreeing that no signatory state would
abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United Nations. Since there
is no easy way to tell what those privileges and immunities are and little help can
be obtained from Supreme Court cases about the corresponding phrase in our Constitution,23 the writer has nothing to say about this suggestion until it is embodied
in some actual UN proposal. Then we can know exactly what we are discussing.
There is considerable force to Holcombe's main conclusion, that the best chances
of immediate success are in tackling human rights problems which cross international boundaries and involve more than one country. When a treaty obligating
one nation directly promotes the interests of another nation, as is usually the case,
then this second nation has incentives to sign it and to complain if it be violated.
Such a treaty is more likely to be faithfully carried out than a treaty like the Covenant, where outside nations may have no cause for objecting to violations beyond
an abstract devotion to fundamental human rights. Furthermore, some agreements
of the sort Holcombe envisages are badly needed. An example which occurs to the
writer is an agreement among many nations that when a female citizen of one
country marries a male citizen of another country, she has the right to leave her
own land and join her husband at his home. It would be even better if he too
were allowed to emigrate and live with his wife whenever they prefer her country
to his.
In the area of freedom of information, great importance attaches to a much
freer flow of news and ideas across frontiers. This was stressed by the General
Assembly in calling the Geneva Conference. The most fruitful achievement of
v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (925).
21 See cases cited note 21 supra.
22 Gitlow
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that Conference consisted of two draft conventions, one proposed by the United
States to facilitate the gathering of news by foreign correspondents and its transmission to their own journals at home,24 the other proposed by France to establish
an international right of correction of statements of fact in news reports sent from
one country to another 5 These two conventions, after many vicissitudes, have
been happily merged into one and put in final form by the General Assembly in
May I949.26 If all goes well, this Convention on the International Transmission of
News and the Right of Correction will be signed by many nations long before work
is completed on the Covenant on Human Rights. Here is just the thing Holcombe
desires.
Yet the United Nations cannot, as Holcombe urges, stop there. The Convention
is excellent, but it will not be regarded as a reason for shelving Article 17 of the
Covenant. Whether it be wise or not for the Human Rights Commission to concern
itself with the relations of a government to its own citizens, the pressure to go on
with the Covenant is too strong for work- on it to cease now. And contrary to a
common belief among American lawyers, this pressure does not come from the
Soviet Union or its satellites. An examination of the votes in the Commission, the
Sub-Commission, and the Geneva Conference will show that the Soviet bloc have
almost always been against doing anything positive for freedom of information
and other human rights, so long as their own extraordinary wishes could not be
carried out. Thus they were about the only nations which did not vote for the
Declaration of Human Rights in the General Assembly, but insisted on abstaining.
The demand to do something notable for human rights has come from the freedomloving nations of the West and from India and Australia.
A striking illustration of this demand was furnished by the Draft Convention on
Freedom of Information, proposed by the United Kingdom at Geneva.27 This
instrument would enable any two or more nations to guarantee freedom of information within their own borders immediately, in the same terms as Article 17. There
would be no delay while the Covenant is getting finished by the Human Rights
Commission, or before it is signed by the large number of nations required by
Article 23 . ' Thus this treaty undertakes to hasten the very type of UN activity
which Holcombe says ought to be postponed. The writer was unable to understand
the reasons why the British drafted this document. It seemed so un-English, in that
it asserted general principles and did not meet any pressing concrete need as did
the American and French conventions. It aroused speculations whether the Labor
Government was carrying England back into the mental attitudes of the Commonwealth Period, the one epoch in English history when laws were urged for abstract
"'UNIED NATIONS CONFERENCE
5

on

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, FINAL ACT

(Annex A, p. 7).

r at Ix.
7d.

2 A/876, May 16, r949.
" UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FREEDOM OF INFORMATION,

" See note I I, Supra.

Op. Ct.

supra, note 24, at 14.
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reasons. Be this as it may, the important fact is that the British convention received

widespread support at the Conference from other freedom-loving delegates, was
overwhelmingly adopted at the plenary session, and seems likely to be signed by
several nations whenever it is submitted by the General Assembly. It even led to the
startling suggestion in the Human Rights Commission last June that Article 17
might be omitted from the Covenant as a useless duplication of the British convention 2 A Bill of Rights which omitted freedom of speech and press would indeed
be a novelty.
To summarize what can be learned for UN purposes from our own constitutional experience with human rights: It is useful because it indicates the probable
areas for rapid success and because it warns against biting off more than you can
chew. Yet this experience is not quite in point. There are at least two reasons why
it may be neither necessary nor desirable for the United Nations to imitate our
decades of delay before undertaking to establish human rights inside the states.
First, the Covenant requires less strength in the central agency than does the
Fourteenth Amendment. Our federal courts have enough power behind them to
let the victims of state oppression out of prison and sometimes to put the oppressors
themselves into prison. Nobody contemplates any such drastic action by the Human
Rights Commission or by any other UN body. Just how the rights in the Covenant
are to be implemented is not yet decided, but we may reasonably expect measures
like the receipt of complaints of violations with discussion in documents and UN
meetings. Perhaps there will also be authorization for an impartial investigation and
a report. Publicity will probably be the chief sanction for the Covenant. If we can
only get the peace treaties out of the way and obtain a better international feeling
than now prevails, "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind" may be enough to
make the Covenant operate with as much compliance as many domestic statutes
receive, even though the United Nations is given no power to proceed by force
against violators.
Secondly, lawmakers in each epoch have to face the needs of that epoch. The
practical men who met at Philadelphia in 1787 knew this well and did not undertake to impose restrictions on the states unless they were urgently required by
existing conditions. There was no pressing reason then to guarantee human rights
inside the states, because the states were doing a pretty good job at this themselvesapart from slavery, which it was impossible to touch. Whenever restrictions on
the states were badly needed, for example to stop the issue of irredeemable paper
money, the framers unhesitatingly wrote them into the Constitution, regardless of the
danger of clashes with state governments. The lawmakers for the United Nations
ought to show corresponding courage and resourcefulness in donfronting the
pressing needs of our time, and one of these is for some sort of restraints on nations
to lessen the suppression of public discussion and attacks on other cherished human
211REPORT op T=E FIFTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RiGHTs,

This query was made by the representative of China.

op.

ct. supra, note 9,

at 34.
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values. There are few more potent causes of international ill-will than when a
nation denies basic freedoms inside its boundaries. Such a nation becomes a plaguespot. When our own government is protesting the trial of a Hungarian Cardinal
in Hungary and the trial of Bulgarian Protestant ministers in Bulgaria, it is no
longer possible to regard religious freedom and a fair trial as purely domestic
matters.
The examples just cited demonstrate the impossibility of rigorously maintaining
the distinction, suggested by Holcombe's book, between a nation's denial of human
rights to its own citizens and to foreigners. Despite what was previously said, the
latter situation is not the only source of serious resentment in other nations. Many
men who owe allegiance to different governments are united by strong emotional
ties of race, blood, or religion, or by a common devotion to trade-unionism, science,
or scholarship, and so feel deeply the sufferings of their fellows regardless of
political divisions. Milton's sonnet On The Late Massacre in Piedmont, Secretary
Hay's protest against Russian pogroms, the manifesto of the Faculty of the University of Amsterdam upon the fate of professors in Nazi Germany-these are only
a few proofs that international concern is not confined to the rights and wrongs of
resident aliens. Probably that is the best place to start, as in the French and
American conventions at the Geneva Conference, but it is not the place to stop.
III
WOULD ARTICLE 17 BE

PART OF AN UNCONSTIrUTIONAL TREATY?

The two preceding paragraphs seem to take care of the objection raised by a
distinguished lawyer, Carl B. Rix, in a recent address to the American Society of
International Law, that the Covenant may be outside the treaty-making power of
the President and the Senate 0 because of being domestic legislation 1 This objection rests on what Chief Justice Hughes said to the same Society in 1929 about
possible limits on the treaty-making power-" '
[This] is a sovereign nation; . . . the nation has power to make any agreement whatever in a constitutional manner that relates to the conduct of our international relations,

unless there can be found some express prohibition in the Constitution ... But if we at.
tempted to use the treaty-making power to deal with matters which did not pertain to our
external relations but to control matters which normally and appropriatelywere within the

local jurisdictionsof the States, then ... there might be ground for implying a limitation
upon the treaty-making power that it is intended for the purpose of having treaties made
relating to foreign affairs and not to make laws for the people of the United States in their

internal concerns....
One can imagine examples within Hughes' limitation, like a treaty with Eire
providing that Boston should have a city-manager form of government with proU. S. CONSr. Art. II, S2.
" Rix, Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the Covenant Under Our Constitution, 35

30

A.B.A.J. 550, 554, 68 (949).
" Pxoc. Am. Soc'y INT'Lt L. 195-196 (1929).

(Italics supplied.)
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portional representation or a treaty with -Great Britain restoring primogeniture in
Virginia. Nevertheless, as just shown, freedom of information is no longer a local
concern. It is something which nations do now put into treaties. It is in several of
the peace treaties already concluded since 1945, and most of the nations at the Geneva
Conference approved the British draft convention, which dealt with nothing except
freedom of information.
IV
Is ARTICLE 17 INVALIDATED BY THE "DoMESTIC" CLAusE OF Tn

CHARTER?

This problem received no attention from the Sub-Commission or the Geneva
Conference. We took it for granted that the Economic and Social Council and the
Human Rights Commission knew their business when they undertook an International Bill of Rights and the Covenant. However, the Soviet member of the
Sub-Commission and several prominent lawyers in the American Bar Association
have argued that the UN is prevented from having any voice in the relations between
the individual and his government by Article 2, section 7, of the Charter, which says:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in any matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter ...

If this important provision really bars any concern with human rights and
fundamental freedoms, all the Charter clauses mentioned earlier as dealing with
such matters would be meaningless. Yet they are just as much a part of the Charter
as the provision about domestic matters. Consequently, we must apply the principle
with which all lawyers are familiar, that when there is an apparent inconsistency
between different portions of a constitution or statute, then it is necessary to read
each provision in connection with the others and try to reach a mutual adjustment
which makes sense and gives effect, if possible, to every part of the document. When
the draftsmen at San Francisco wrote Article 68 ordering the Human Rights Commission, they certainly did not think that they were writing nonsense. They were
well aware of the provision on domestic matters and obviously intended that the
Human Rights Commission should be able to do some work which was not forbidden by Article 2.
It is true that there are difficulties about the precise limits of the "domestic"
clause in this connection, but the work already undertaken by the UN in the field
of freedoms seems plainly outside the scope of that clause. Much of it consists of
the studies, reports, and recommendations which are expressly mentioned in other
articles of the Charter. They are not intervening; they do not require the member
nations to submit such matters to settlement. As for the Covenant and the Geneva
draft treaties, these are to bind only nations which consent to be bound. Many existing treaties relate to matters within a nation, for example, by guaranteeing to citizens
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of another government the right to inherit land on equal terms with native citizens.
Of course it is no violation of national sovereignty for a nation to agree with another
that it will make a desirable change in its own laws. One of the chief values of
the UN is to act as a sort of clearing house for facilitating treaties which will remove or lessen local causes of international friction. The numerous labor conventions adopted under the auspices of the League of Nations and the UN are a
conspicuous illustration of this, and the increase of freedom is an equally appropriate
subject for future treaties.
V
SHOULD ARnCLE

17 BE SELF-ExECUTING?

Although the Sub-Commission and the Geneva Conference could do nothing

about this question, which arises for all the rights in the Covenant and has been the
object of earnest thought in the State Department, the importance of the problem
became evident to the writer during the drafting of Article 17. The binding effect of
its formulation of the right to freedom of expression depended on the overall obligations of the signatory nations, as set forth in Article 2. At the time we were working,
in the early months of 1948, the critical portion of Article 2 had the following
88

form:

"Every State, party hereto, undertakes to ensure:
(a) that its laws secure to all persons under its jurisdiction, whether
citizens, persons of foreign nationality or stateless persons, the enjoyment of these human rights and fundamental freedoms;"
It will be convenient to break down the problem into four parts: (i) the difference between self-executing treaties and other treaties; (2) whether a treaty has to
be self-executing in the United States; (3) the undesirability of allowing the Covenant to be self-executing in the United States; (4) methods of preventing this.
A. The Difference between Self-Executing Treaties and Other Treaties
There are two aspects to the binding effect of a treaty. In the first place, it becomes internationally binding after the performance of certain acts. In many nations
the consent of the executive alone is enough. By our Constitution ratification by
two-thirds of the Senate is also required. In addition the treaty may itself provide
for further acts before it becomes effective, for instance, the deposit of ratifications,
but this element need not concern us. The point is that when the required acts have
been performed, the good faith of each acceding government is pledged to the
performance of the treaty. A violation of a treaty obligation may lead to diplomatic
remonstrances and to stronger acts by the other parties to the treaty. Violation may
also become the subject of a proceeding before an international tribunal. For
present purposes it will be assumed that our government will take all the necessary
'3 SECOND REPORT OF ThE COMmiSSION ON HumAN RiGHTs, Dec. 17, 1947 (E/6oo, p. 30).
fications of this text in later reports are set forth infra notes 63 and 64.

Thc modi.
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steps to make the Covenant on Human Rights binding upon it in the manner just

described.
Secondly, a treaty such as the Covenant is intended to become binding upon the
officials and private citizens of the signatory parties. Probably no treaty ever proposed was meant to affect private rights and duties within a country so extensively
as the Covenant. It is contemplated that violations of its terms will give rise to
actions in domestic courts by the victims against wrong-doing officials? 4 The main
problem is to ascertain the method by which this domestically binding effect of the
Covenant may most wisely be obtained.
This domestically binding effect of a treaty does not inevitably accompany its
internationally binding effect. In some countries, notably the United Kingdom and

the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, most treaties do not have
any effect upon private rights until they have been implemented by Act of Parliament or other appropriate domestic legislation. In a famous case in the Privy
Council, Walker v. Baird,"a treaties between Great Britain and France gave French
fishermen certain rights on parts of the Newfoundland coast and provided that no
lobster factories should be operated on these shores. The plaintiff ran such a factory.
A British naval captain forcibly closed it up. Because no Act of Parliament had
been passed to implement the treaty and make it affect the private rights of British
subjects, the naval captain was held liable in damages to the owner of the factory.
The fact that the captain's action was an enforcement of the treaty was no defense.
The winning counsel argued :36
No case can be found in which the Crown has attempted in time of peace to affect
by treaty the private rights of its subjects. For that purpose an Act of Parliament is
necessary .... There is no authority for saying that State necessity will make a treaty
binding upon subjects by force of the prerogative. Such a doctrine would extend the
prerogative of the Crown so as to enable it to deprive the subject of his property and

rights.
7
This British theory of treaties was recognized by Justice Miller!
Consequently, if the Covenant on Human Rights is ratified by the United Kingdom, it will not become binding on British subjects or in the British courts until'implementing legislation is enacted by parliament. In other words, the Covenant will
not be self-executing in the United Kingdom.

" Ibid. Article 2(c) and (d). These became (b) and (c) in Report of the Third Session (E/8oo,
p. 15). They are now merged without substantial change into Article 2, §2. RpsoRaT oF THE FIrts
SESSION (E/1371, p. 28): "Each State . . . undertakes to ensure that any persons whose rights or freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy before the competent national tribunals notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
There seems to be no ground for the fear, expressed by some American lawyers, that these clauses
about court actions under the Covenant are self-executing regardless of the opening passage of Article
2. These clauses simply demarcate the consequences of the Covenant after it is made a part of domestic
law, in accordance with the obligations of international good faith. Recall that these clauses will
apply in nations like Great Britain, where treaties are never self-executing.
"G[1892] A. C. 491.
" Id. at 494.
"7 United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 417 (1886).

56o

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

In the United States, ordinarily, treaties are self-executing. Article VI of our
Constitution provides that "all treaties ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land...."
For example, if we make a treaty with France that when a French citizen dies in this
country his property shall descend like that of American citizens, this treaty automatically nullifies as to the French heirs of a dead Frenchman a state law forbidding
foreigners to inherit land in that state. No Act of Congress and no state statute
is required to implement the treaty with France.
The doctrine was recently applied in Bacardi Corporation v. DomenehV8

The Inter-American Trade Mark Convention of 1929 provided that every mark
duly registered in one of the contracting states should be "legally protected" in the
other contracting states. The plaintiff had a license to use registered Cuban trademarks in Puerto Rico, but a Puerto Rican statute made it illegal for him to do so.
No Act of Congress implementing the Convention was mentioned, but the statute
was held invalid to the extent that it conflicted with the Convention. Chief Justice
Hughes said:" "This treaty on ratification became a part of our law. No special
legislation in the United States was necessary to make it effective." Perhaps this
result was somewhat aided by a clause in the Convention that its provisions should
"have the force of law in those States in which international treaties possess that
character, as soon as they are ratified by their constitutional organs."
Subsequently, the Warsaw Convention for Unification of Rules as to International
Transportation by Air was held to be self-executing for the purpose of limiting the
amount of recovery in two damage actions arising out of airplane accidents. 4 °
B. Does a Treaty Have to Be Self-Executing in the United States?
Despite what has just been said, it is possible for the government of the United
States to make treaties which are not self-executing but which must be implemented
by Act of Congress. An obvious example is a treaty providing that our government
shall pay a sum of money. Then nothing happens until Congress appropriates the
money. This was pointed out nearly a century ago in Turner v. American Baptist
Missionary Society.4' Even before this, Chief Justice Marshall had held, in Foster v.
Neilson,4 2. that the treaty acquiring Florida from Spain was not self-executing as to
its clause confirming Spanish land grants, but that such a grant must in addition be
approved by a board of commissioners which had been established by Congress after
the treaty. In short, the Act of Congress in this case implements the treaty just as
an Act of Parliament implements a British treaty.
In the course of rejecting the plaintiff's claim under a grant which the commissioners had not confirmed, Marshall quoted the treaty provision that all the Spanish
as3 1

U. S. 150 (1940).

"Id. at x61.
"Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 (S. D. N. Y. 1944); Garcia
v. Pan American Airways, 269 App. Div. 287, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 317 (945).
41 24 Fed. Cas. 344, No. 14,251 (C. C. Mich. 1852).

422 Pet. 2.53 (U. S. 1829).

Accord: Ex parte Dove, 49 F. 2d 816 (D. Minn. 1945).
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grants "shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession" to the same
extent as if Florida had not been ceded, and asked:"
Do these words act directly on the grants, so as to give validity to those not otherwise
valid; or do they pledge the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and

confirm them?
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does
not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far as its operation is intra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign power of the

respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established.

Our constitution declares a

treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract,
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself
to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the court.
Additional cases holding treaties not to be self-executing will be mentioned later,
as well as several other treaties made by the United States which contemplate legislation before they become operative as domestic law.
C. Article 17 and the Rest of the Covenant Should Not Be Allowed to Be
Self-Executing in the United States
At the outset it is important to observe that, so far as state law is concerned, the
Covenant cannot be self-executing if Article : 4 is retained substantially in its present
form. This provides that in a federal nation like ours, matters which under the
constitutional system are appropriate for state action shall be brought to the notice
of the proper state authorities with a favorable recommendation from the federal
government. Until the state government acts on such a recommendation, the Covenant will not impair existing or subsequent state laws.
The area of federal law, however, needs serious consideration. Here we must
distinguish between Acts of Congress before the ratification of the Covenant and
those after such ratification. A subsequent federal statute which violates an article
of the Covenant will be a breach of our international obligation, but it will be valid.
The Supreme Court has frequently held that an Act of Congress is the law of the
44
land even though it is inconsistent with an earlier treaty.
What concerns us, then, is the effect of the Covenant on earlier federal statutes.
Here again the later legal action prevails. In the event of inconsistency, the treaty
is the law of the land and supersedes the earlier statutes.
Little confusion is caused by this doctrine when a treaty relates to a few clearly
defined areas of domestic law. Then, a government official or a lawyer can tell
pretty well what domestic statutes have been superseded by the treaty in question.
42 Pet. at 314.
"See

5 GREEN H. HACxWORTH, DIosr

oF INTRNATiox1AL LAw 185-x98 (1940).
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The situation will be altogether different with respect to the Covenant, if it be selfexecuting. Its provisions are so numerous and so broad that they may apply very
unexpectedly in all sorts of places. Furthermore, it is often difficult to say whether
a particular federal statute is inconsistent with an article of the Covenant or not. For
instance, several persons have thought that Article 17 as drafted by the Sub-Commission and the Geneva Conference is inconsistent with the present statutory power
of the Securities and Exchange Commission to prohibit a prospectus which has not
been approved by the SEC. My own opinion is to the contrary, but it would be very
undesirable to leave this question in long uncertainty until it was settled by the
Supreme Court.
If the Covenant is to be self-executing, an enormous and painstaking examination
of the whole United States Code would be necessary. The situation would be
something like that presented by the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the
Constitution. If women are to be guaranteed exactly the same rights as men, no
more and no less, it is very hard to say how many existing laws will be changed
and to what extent. For instance, if a statute allows boys to marry at 18 and girls at
x6, which age applies to both under the Amendment? Will the crime of rape
be abolished since it is applicable to one sex of offenders? The undesirable consequences of giving an unexpected and sweeping effect to international transactions in
relation to domestic law is pointed out by Manley 0. Hudson in his note on "Integrity
of International Instruments." 45
Another consequence of a self-executing Covenant is that our government will
naturally try to qualify many articles of the Covenant, in order to prevent their
automatic operation from invalidating federal statutes which are considered to be
very desirable. Thus the Covenant will be unduly lengthened because of the
special situation of the United States.
In as much as the Covenant will not be self-executing in the United Kingdom
and the British Commonwealth, it seems fair to place the United States on the same
level as these other countries.46 If our government insists on appropriate language
to prevent the Covenant from becoming self-executing, no legitimate objection to
this clause can be made by the other parties to the Covenant.
D. Methods of Preventing the Covenant from Being Self-Executing
It was by no means clear that Article 2, as it was drafted in December, 1947 and
already quoted, 4' avoided the danger of being self-executing. The writer was inclined to think that the Supreme Court would construe it as merely pledging the
good faith of the United States that Congress would repeal or amend any statutes
inconsistent with the Covenant. Yet many persons took the opposite view. Any
doubts on such an important matter were regrettable. Fortunately the State De45 42 Am. J. IN'XL L. 105

(948).
"' As to the situation in 'other parts of the world, see Wright, The Legal Nature of Treaties, zo Aht.
J. INT'L L. 7o6 (zx16).
"' See note 33 supra.
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partment and the Human Rights Commission have grappled vigorously with this
problem. Before presenting their later modifications of Article 2, the writer ventures
a few observations on methods of preventing a treaty from automatically becoming
domestic law, where such a result is undesirable.
Many American treaties have not made it plain whether they are self-executing or
not. The decision may then somewhat depend upon the nature of the treaty. A
treaty for the payment of money has been mentioned as not self-executing. 8 Justice
Curtis in x855 thought that a treaty relating to tariff duties was merely a contract
to legislate.49 On the other hand, material collected by Hackworth shows that the
Department of State has recently regarded the most-favored-nation clause in provisions of commercial treaties as effective without the subsequent enactment of congressional legislation.5" In the Florida land grant case, the fact that Congress had
acted to implement the treaty with Spain made it easier for Chief Justice Marshall
to declare that the clause about land titles was not self-executing.*' A decision by
Judge Parker in 1929 holds that treaties about patents are not self-executing.
The
complexity of the patent law and the administrative machinery is said to call for
congressional action. But the authority of this decision is somewhat shaken by the
Bacardi case in the Supreme Court,53 which holds that a trademark treaty is selfexecuting. Probably the two cases can be distinguished, but it is evident that one
cannot rely on the subject-matter of a treaty as determinative of the question of its
self-executing character. Furthermore, when we come to the Covenant on Human
Rights, its extensive concern with domestic rights and duties would seem to make
it prima facie self-executing in the United States so far as subject-matter goes.
Consequently, plain language will be necessary to prevent this undesirable result.
Such language might be inserted in the Covenant itself or in our ratification of the
Covenant. If it were in the ratification it would be a sort of reservation and it would
require the consent of the other parties to the Covenant. Some such procedure has
been followed at times, 5 4 but would be objectionable in this instance. Therefore
it would seem that the Covenant itself should contain the necessary language to
prevent it from being self-executing in the United States.
The most useful discussion of this problem is in an article by Edwin D. Dickinson, "Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?" 5 He says:
Treaties not infrequently stipulate in terms that they shall be put into effect by legislative
enactment.... Whatever the reason for proceeding by this avenue may be, if the treaty
by its terms requires legislative action to make it effective, the result is clear. The treaty
is not self-executing.
'" See note 41 supra.

Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784, No. 13,799 (C. C. Mass. 1855).
SHAIcKWORTiH, op. at. supra, note 44, at 179-I83.
"xSee note 42 supra.
2 Robertson v. General Electric Co., 32 F. 2d 495 (C. C. A. 4th x929), cert. denied, 280 U. S. 571
(1929). See 29 Mic. L. REv.
"aSee note 38 supra.

630 (1930).

" See the case of the Cuban Convention in
5

o Aii. J. INe'L L. 444, 448 (1926).

HACKWOR'rs,

op. cit. supra, note 44, at 203-204.
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Dickinson lists four American treaties containing such express language.o One
is an old treaty with Russia in 1824 .17 The Multipartite Convention of 1884 for the
1
Protection of Submarine Cables said : 8
Article XII. The High Contracting Parties engage to take or to propose to their
respective legislative bodies the measures necessary in order to secure the execution of this
Convention, and especially in order to cause the punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, or both, of such persons as may violate the provisions of articles II., V. and VI.
Article XIII. The High Contracting Parties shall communicate to each other such
laws as may already have been or as may hereafter be enacted in their respective countries,
relative to the subject of the Convention.
The fur seal treaty of 1911 with Great Britain, Japan, and Russia, declared:"'
Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to enact and enforce such legislation as
may be necessary to make effective the foregoing provisions with appropriate penalties for
violations thereof.
The migratory bird treaty of 1916 with Great Britain read:" °
The High Contracting Powers agree themselves to take, or propose to the respective
appropriate law-making bodies, the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the
present Convention.
Congress enacted legislation to carry out each of these treaties.P1
Professor Hudson has called the writer's attention to the Montreal International
Labor Organization Convention of October 9, 1946, and also to the Multipartite
Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1931,02 which says in Article XV:
The High Contracting Parties shall take all necessary legislative or other measures in
order to give effect within their territories to the provisions of this Convention.
These models are available for adaptation in the Covenant, but thus far the
Human Rights Commission has taken a different course in revising Article 2 since
the Geneva Conference. The draft of June, 1948, contained an undertaking "that
such rights and freedoms where not now provided under existing rules and procedures be given effect in its domestic law through the adoption of appropriate laws
and procedures." '
This was still further improved in June 1949. The first section of Article 2 now reads:"
88

1d. at 448 n. 20.
5'2 WiLLro M. MALLOY, TREATISES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, ANI) AGREE.aENTrs BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND OnsER POWERS 1512, 1513 (1910). See 4 STAr. 276 (May
19, 1828).

8
so37 STAT. 1542, Art. VI (July i, 19xi).
" 1d. at 1954.
80 39 STAT. 1702, Art. VIII (Aug. x6, x916).
"'Dickinson, supra note 56. See also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 46 (1920).
025 MANLEY 0. HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1048 (941).
"REPORT OF THIRD SESSION (E/8oo, p. 15).
*'REPORT OF Finm SESSION (E/1371, p. 28).

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN TIBE UNITED NATIONS

565

Each State party hereto undertakes to ensure to all individuals within its jurisdiction
the rights defined in this Covenant. Where not already provided by legislative or other
measures, each State undertakes, in accordance with its constitutional processes and in
accordance with the provisions of this Covenant, to adopt within a reasonable time such
legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights defined in this Covenant.
This seems to solve the problem. At any rate, there is no reason for hostile critics
of the Covenant to assume that it will be self-executing. If this draft does not prevent that effect, some better draft can be found to do the job. With the models at
hand which were lately quoted from several American treaties, it must be possible
for Article z to make it unmistakably plain that Congress must act before existing
federal law is modified to conform to the Covenant.
The Covenant will be far more successful if it operates as an international obligation of good faith than if, in addition, it serves as an uncertain and dislocating
factor in federal law, upsetting nobody knows what until costly litigation comes
to an end.
VI
THE STRuCruR OF ARTICLE 17
Before the Sub-Commission had worked many hours on the text of Article 17,
we found that the main provisions were arranging themselves in our minds on three
levels.
First. There must be an affirmative description of freedom of thought and expression, which the signatory nations were to obligate themselves to protect as a
fundamental human right. In order to avoid any loopholes, we specifically mentioned various aspects of freedom of information and various modes of communication. This affirmative provision was framed by the Sub-Commission with great
care, so as to be a firm and wide statement of the freedom which underlies all the
other freedoms. In as much as the problems here encountered concerned style rather
than law, only one will be discussed in these pages.
Second. Article 17 would have to contain permissive limitations on this broad
freedom. In some form or other, we needed to define the types of objectionable
language which a nation could control if it so desired. This portion of both the
Sub-Commission and Conference drafts caused the most trouble and has aroused
bitter attacks. Hence the problems involved will be the chief object of attention
in the rest of what the writer has to say.
Third. Since there were obvious risks that the permissive limitations might be
abused by a nation so as to stifle desirable discussion, safeguards against this ought
to be established. This important point will be elaborated in the course of dealing
with the permissive limitations.
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VII
SHOULD FREEDOM OF INFORMATION BE PROTECTED AGAINST
ONLY GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE?

This was the one serious legal problem which arose in the affirmative definition
of the rights in Article 17. Most articles of the Covenant run against everybody.
"It shall be unlawful to deprive any person of his life . . ." "No person shall be

deprived of his liberty . . ." In this respect, the Covenant articles go beyond the
Fourteenth Amendment, which protects human rights against only action by
states, cities, etc., and their officials, and does not apply to private wrongs. For.
instance, it could not be used to punish the violent intimidation of Negroes by the
Ku Klux Klan. Lauterpacht opposes such a distinction in the Covenant,"' and the
Human Rights Commission has been wise in abandoning it for rights like life,
liberty, bodily safety, and a fair trial, which have long been protected by law against
any sort of interference. It makes little difference whether this established protection is given by constitutions or by other parts of the law, such as criminal codes
and the writ of habeas corpus. The point is that the Covenant does not obligate the
United States or any other civilized nation to do anything novel in punishing murder or rescuing somebody from imprisonment by a gang of thugs. We do not
want the nations which sign the Covenant to dodge responsibility for lynchings and
other organized forms of violence, which often exist because of governmental connivance or inefficiency.
Freedom of speech, however, is in a somewhat different situation. Historically it
grew up as an immunity against suppression by governments and government
officials. Except in such matters as organizing labor unions, the law has done little
to prevent one private person from imposing restrictions upon the utterances of
another private person. Was it desirable to create an international grievance whenever a high school principal excluded a story from the students' magazine or a
college professor was dismissed for heterodox ideas or a newspaper publisher refused
to print an article prepared by a reporter? Serious evils are indeed created by deprivations of academic freedom and by the bias of some of the men who control
newspapers, but attempts to end these evils by law are likely to put government
officials in charge of private discussion. The proper remedy lies in public opinion
and the development of a genuine professional spirit among all those concerned
with an educational institution or a newspaper."6
Therefore, the Sub-Commission draft of Article 17 begins: "Every person shall
have the right to freedom of thought and expression without interference by governmental action.. " and the italicized words were also used in the Conference draft.
Or Lauterpacht, Human Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, and the InternationalBill of the
Rights of Man, 19-2o (REPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COMMIITrEE, INTERNATIONAL LAW Ass'N, BRUSSELS
CONFERENCE, 1948).
" See A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (COMMISSION

ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 1947), passim;

ZECHAR AH CHAFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS CC. 23 and 24 (1947).
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Their omission in the French draft now before the Human Rights Commission
raises serious questions. 6 7
VIII
THE NECESSITY OF SOME SORT OF LIMITATIONS

Several hostile American critics of the Sub-Commission among newspapermen
have accused it of granting freedom of the press with one hand and snatching it

away with the other. Thus Hugh Baille, the President of the United Press Associations, said in part of a letter about Article i7:
It is my opinion its adoption would constitute a long step in the direction of bringing
the American press under the government's thumb, in contravention of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
This is the very opposite of what I had in mind when the drive for greater freedom of
information throughout the world was started.
I refer specifically to paragraph 2. Under subdivision (a), that penalties could be
imposed upon the press for reporting "matters which must remain secret in the vital
interests of the state," would not governments, with the blessing of the United Nations,
be encouraged to draw up lists of classified subjects which shall be taboo in the press and
to pass laws to enforce that taboo, thus bringing about a peacetime censorship?
Subdivision (b) says the press could be punished for "expressions which incite persons
to alter by violence the system of government." Not long ago the United Nations Assembly called on all countries to withdraw their ambassadors from Spain. This certainly could
be construed as an attempt to incite the Spanish people to overthrow Franco. In that case
could we be charged with violating the Covenant for reporting an action by the United
Nations and distributing it to newspapers throughout the world? How about reporting
the speech of a Hyde Park orator who calls for the overthrow of the monarchy in Britain?
Subdivision (e) proscribes "expressions injurious to the fair conduct of legal proceedings": Judges even now try occasionally to muzzle the press by contempt proceedings
against reporters or editors. Does not this provision in (e) condone such actions by
judges which are resisted by the press whenever they arise, and invite an extension of
censorship from the bench, sanctioned by the United Nations?
And other critics cried out, why not merely define the right and stop as the First
Amendment doesCongress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
It does not bristle with limitations like Article 17.
It is true that the First Amendment does not mention any limitations, but they
are there just the same. Newspapers can be made to pay for libels, sellers of obscene
books can be punished, and men can be punished for improperly discussing pending
court cases. The framers of the First Amendment and the corresponding provisions
in state constitutions did not spell out such exceptions. They took them for granted
because they were part of their legal background in familiar principles of our judgemade law and occasionally in legislation. Moreover, the First Amendment is con8

7 See the three drafts in AppendLx II.
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strued by the Supreme Court in relation to the original Constitution, and limitations
are read into it from the affirmative powers of Congress. Consequently, Eugene Debs
was imprisoned for what he said about our entering the First World War, indecent
books are barred from the mails or seized by the customs, and anarchists have been
deported for what they merely thought.
Now, this device of judicially implied limitations upon an apparently absolute
freedom is obviously impossible for an international treaty like the Covenant. It
stands by itself; if it grants complete immunity for talk and printing, there is no
underlying document like our original Constitution to cut down that immunity.
And the framers of Article 17 cannot take anything for granted. They cannot
assume a backgrouid of familiar law, because the Covenant is intended to bind
many nations, each of which has its own sort of law. Every nation which signs
the Covenant ought to be told plainly how much it promises and what it does not
promise. Therefore, the limitations on freedom of speech, which are understood
without being mentioned in a domestic constitution, need to be spelled out carefully
in a treaty provision on free speech.
Furthermore, the twelve members of the Sub-Commission were not just describing an ideal situation in Utopia. We were preparing a treaty with the hope
fhat it would be signed and ratified by two-thirds of the states in the United Nations.
Otherwise, our work would not become law. Consequently, we had to frame the
kind of promises which governments could reasonably be expected to sign. If we
drafted a promise which left no opening for a government to punish a person who
betrayed its secret plans of forts and airplanes, there was very little prospect that
our government or the British government would sign it, to say nothing of others.
So it was thought essential to permit governments to retain a reasonable power of
control with regard to matters where serious danger from abuses of free speech has
long been recognized and where some regulation of newspapers is customary in
free societies like England and the United States.
The necessity of allowing some penalities on objectionable publications is plain.
Freedom of speech is not the only purpose for which a society exists. It is a tremendously important purpose, but there are other important purposes like national
safety, the administration of justice, and the protection of individuals from harm.
Government leaders and many patriotic citizens would be outraged if our nation
were asked to sign a treaty which pledged our federal and state governments not
to take any action against a treasonable newspaper or a pornographic film and
never to award damages for libels. Some areas had to be blocked out within which
penalties might legitimately be imposed, if Congress or the state legislatures should
wish. A similar attitude naturally exists in other nations, and ought to be constantly
kept inmind.
The limitations in Article 17 take care of this situation, but they impose no
restrictions whatever upon the press. They are merely permissive. "Penalties . ..
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may . .. be imposed" against specified types of utterances. That is all. Nothing

requires a government to punish the disclosure of state secrets or violent revolutionary
talk or contempt of court. Article 17 simply says that if a government does choose

to punish such matters, it will not be violating the Covenant.
There is absolutely no basis for any fears that our ratification of Article 17 would
supersede the First Amendment. In the first place, if they did conflict, this would
merely nullify Article 17 pro tanto as an obligation of the United States. Although
the treaty-making power does affect the balance between nation and states by
allowing the President and two-thirds of the Senate to do some things which a
majority of both houses of Congress cannot do, e.g., entitling aliens to inherit land
within a state, nevertheless a treaty cannot validly disregard an express prohibition
in the Constitution, such as the First Amendment. This was the position of Chief
Justice Hughes in the address previously quoted,"8 and the writer knows of no
Supreme Court authority to the contrary.
Secondly, no conflict exists between the First Amendment and the Sub-Commission draft of Article 17. The same proposition holds good for the Conference
draft and for any other draft that is likely to be promulgated by the United Nations.
Perplexities might indeed arise if the Covenant affirmatively undertook to compel
our government to punish a type of utterance which was conceivably within the
constitutional protection of the First Amendment. The Soviet draft already mentioned as now before the Human Rights Commission may present this difficulty,69
but its adoption seems very improbable in view of the steadfast and overwhelming
opposition of the Sub-Commission and the Geneva Conference to similar Soviet
proposals flatly denying freedom of expression to vague categories like fascism and
warmongering. Instead, the policy of merely optional limitations has always
prevailed. The closest approach to trouble was caused by a different article (21)
which appeared in the earliest draft of the Covenant: "Any advocacy of national,
racial or religious hostility that constitutes an incitement to violence shall be prohibited by the law of the State."7 Objectionable as such forms of hostility are, this
was not the right way to deal with them and it raised grave constitutional questions
for the United States. Fortunately, Article 21 is shelved in the June, 1949, draft and
may perhaps be much changed. Article 17, at any rate, contains nothing compulsory
except the obligation to grant freedom of thought and expression. The limitations
leave Congress completely free to do nothing or to deal with the specified types of
speech by enacting any laws it pleases within the scope of the First Amendment
and other clauses of the Constitution. The same open choice is possessed by state
legislatures, in so far as the states come within the Covenant at all (in view of the
"'See note 32 supra. There is no need, in this connection, to worry about problems arising if the
United States were terribly defeated in a war and then forced to sign a peace treaty contrary to constitutional prohibitions.
"See

note zo supra.

"' REPORT OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THsE COMMISSON ON HUMAN RIGH-TS, Dec.

35). Compare
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article on federal nations). It is also noteworthy that all the limitations in Article
17, with the possible exception of (h) in the Conference draft-the Indian amendment hereafter discussed-correspond with the types of objectionable utterances

which the Supreme Court allows to be controlled under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. In short, Article 17 merely qualifies the broad promise to guarantee
freedom of information by authorizing each signatory nation to have, if it wishes,
certain kinds of suppressive laws in accordance with its own constitutional system.
Ix
ON

BLANKET LIMITATION OR SEVERAL SPECIFIC LIMiTATIONs?

This is the most complex and baffling of all the legal problems raised by Article
17. The method of specific limitations was chosen by both the Sub-Commission
and the Geneva Conference (see Appendix II, Drafts A and B). The United
States government, however, has always urged a single blanket limitation to the
effect that
freedom of expression may be limited oily to protect the rights of others and the
freedom, welfare, and security of all.j 1
This resulted from the attitude of our government toward the Covenant as a
whole. During the preparation of the original draft of the Covenant by the Human Rights Commission in December 1947, the United States wished to have no
limitations at all in the articles defining the various substantive rights, but to deal
with this essential matter by an overall article resembling in a general way the
language just quoted. 72 That was the plan followed in the Declaration of Human
Rights.73 After the Commission had decided otherwise as to the Covenant and inserted specific limitations in many articles, our government thought that it would still
be desirable to use the idea of a blanket limitation in Article 17.
When this idea was suggested to the Sub-Commission, it took about ten seconds
to show that nobody wanted it. In Geneva, the blanket limitation was thoroughly
discussed and repeatedly voted down by irresistible majorities. Since the French
draft now before the Human Rights Commission (Appendix II, Draft C) resembles
the American proposal, the controversy will probably be renewed at its sixth session
in 195o.

The main reason why the blanket limitation was rejected by the Sub-Commission
and the Conference was because it makes nearly meaningless the affirmative right
in the first paragraph of Article 17. Such terms as the "welfare and security of
all" could be used to justify almost any restriction on freedom of expression which
any official or legislature would be likely to want to impose. The most ardent
advocates of suppression, like Pobedonotsev in Czarist Russia or the Lusk Com'REPORT OF ThE UNITED STATES DELFGATION, Op. dt. supra note

of the Delegation and the writer's minority views.
7 E/6oo, p. 38; see Appendix I of the present article.
" The overall article in the Declaration is 29(2).

7, at 6-8. This states the position

LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FREEDoI OF INFORMATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

571

mittee in New York or the present Un-American Committee, always sincerely be-

lieve that drastic penal laws and censorship are necessary to preserve national
security and promote the general welfare by heading off revolutions, social demoralization, and other calamities.
In view of the omission in the Conference draft of the prohibition of peace-time
censorship, framed by the Sub-Commission, the substitution of the blanket limitation for the present second paragraph of Article 17 would give a very wide scope
for restraints on freedom of speech. It is bad enough to have criminal laws directed
against many types of supposed objectionable utterances, but it is far worse when
a rigid censorship can be established to revise or forbid publications for any cause
which is related to the "welfare and security of all."
If that sort of thing can be done without any violation of Article 17, then the
obligation which the signatory nations assume to maintain freedom of thought and
expression fails to operate in the very situations where toleration is needed.
Nevertheless, there is a good deal to be said on the other side. The case for the
blanket limitation is forcefully presented by Herzel H. E. Plaine of the Department
74
of Justice:
This idea would permit of a style of drafting of a single limitation summarizing the
right of government to deal fairly and reasonably in limiting the rights set forth, but
pursuant only to law and subject at all times to conformity with the article on equal
protection of the law [Article 2o].
In the view of the other school of thought, this was much too broad. [Specific limitations were urged instead.] Viewed abstractly the theory of specific limitations offers
persuasive inducements. Why should not government claim now, and for all time, the
legitimate, specific bases upon which it may deal with and restrict individual liberties,
but only these and no more?
However, as the study of the sources and causes of legislative action progressed and
the realization dawned upon many of the delegates that in one way or another all of
these sources and causes infringe upon and subtract from the unfettered freedoms of man,
it became clearer that there was a good deal of illusion in any attempt to be specific in
dealing with the breadth and depth of reserved legislative power. The so-called specific
limitations which were evolved, either in toto or individually, were no more specific
than the proposed single limitation clause...Y5
"'Forum on Draft Declaration and Covenant of United Nations Human Rights Commission, in PRocEEDINGs OF THE A. B. A. SEcMroN OF INTERNATIONAL AND CoMPA invE LAw 24 (Seattle, Sept. 6-7,

1948). Mr. Plaine is the Adviser from the Department of Justice to the United State Delegation to
ECOSOC and the Human Rights Commission, and held a similar position at the Geneva Conference.
"Mr. Plaine illustrates this statement by Article x6 on freedom of religion, which allows "such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public order and health, morals and the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others." But this is really a blanket limitation, similar to what
our government wants in Article 17. Hence this example gives little support to Mr. Plaine's objections
against specific limitations.
A better argument for Mr. Plaine's position can be based on Article x6. If a blanket limitation was
adopted for freedom of religion, why won't it work for freedom of speech too, in Article 57? The
best reply is, that freedom of religion has strong and widespread support in free nations, and the limitations on it have caused trouble very rarely in law. Polygamy and the worship of poisonous snakes do
not require detailed attention in the Covenant. By contrast, the limitations on freedom of speech need
to be carefully blocked out, because the public at large is constantly concerned with the dangers from
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Other articles like that on freedom of expression present the spectacle of attempting
to saddle a minimum of twenty-two broad areas of limitation upon the the individual's

right to freedom of expression. And the enumeration is not yet complete.
The last paragraph of this quotation brings out the most serious difficulty with
specific limitations in Article 17. At the Geneva Conference it became evident that
the seven clauses framed by the Sub-Commission did not exhaust the possibilities
of legitimate state control over speech. There are a good many other types of
utterances which the governments of free countries are accustomed to suppress or
regulate. These omitted situations tend to proliferate, and the list of possible
additional limitations has now reached twenty-five.76 This includes the disclosures
of professional secrets contrary to law; fraudulent expressions; proper conduct of
election campaigns, e.g., the Hatch Act; profanity in public places; licensing of radio
stations; and regulation of prospectuses of corporate securities, e.g., by the SEC.
And future deliberations or new inventions may turn up more items still.
Practically everybody agrees that the Covenant ought to permit laws on many
of these matters, but the question remains-how can this best be done? To put
them in the form of new specific limitations, besides the seven or eight already
drafted, would make the tail wag the dog and render Article 17 absurdly long.
Another solution is to draft a "basket clause," which will take care of a large
variety of situations ordinarily considered to fall outside the protection of constitutional guaranties of free speech. The express limitations could then be confined
to the types of objectionable utterances which cause the most trouble, as in the
Sub-Commissiogi and Conference drafts. Article 8 on compulsory labor does something of the sort in its final paragraph permitting "minor communal services considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community... ." Yet when attempts were made at Geneva to produce a basket clause,

it always turned out to resemble the United States proposal for a blanket limitation
and aroused similar objections.
A third solution would be to list the main limitations, as now, and then require
each nation to report to the Secretariat any old or new laws in other categories.
Since these laws would always be within the spirit of Article 17, nobody would
object to them. When, however, protests were made, they could be the subject of
diplomatic negotiations, and consideration by the Sub-Commission or other appropriate agency of the United Nations.
No satisfactory solution has yet been reached, but the writer believes that one
can be worked out.
In this connection, it is particularly important that the Covenant should not be
self-executing in the United States, for then much less trouble will be caused by
publications, etc., and liable to forget in times of excitement the very great value of preserving open
discussion.
"REPORT op Fiurss SEssIoN op THE CommissioN O, HUMAN RITS, June 23, 1949 (E/137x, PP.

36-38).
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desirable existing statutes which fall outside the specific limitations in Article 17 or
other articles.

Suppose that such a statute does technically interfere with freedom

of expression.

It will not be automatically nullified by the Covenant, but Con-

gress can decide whether international good faith requires the modification of this
statute. If Congress fails to change a law which other signatory nations consider

objectionable, then those countries may remonstrate with us and Congress can give
the matter further consideration. Something of this sort will inevitably happen
in the United Kingdom and other countries where treaties are not self-executing and
it is only right that the United States should be on the same level.
This whole problem is aggravated by the decision of the Human Rights Commission to postpone provisions for the implementation of the Covenant until the
substantive rights were defined. Here is a striking illustration of the validity of
Lauterpacht's criticism of that policy:"
These two questions [of the substance of the Bill of Rights and its enforcement] are
interconnected. For the enforceability of the Bill must depend on the kind of human
interests which it is to protect. On the other hand, the nature and scope of the rights
which we include in it must be determined by the degree of enforcement which we
decide to adopt in order to make it a reality.

The present situation is as if men had to draft a criminal law without knowing
that there would be any criminal courts or sheriffs. In planning several parts of
Article x7, one's choice of words would be greatly helped if he knew whether

these words were to be interpreted by some UN court or agency, or only by the
nation obligated. This is especially true of the controversy now under consideration"Where ignorant armies clash by night."
For instance, one of the best arguments for a blanket limitation is that it could
receive a definite content from a series of judicial decisions, just as the exceptions
to the First Amendment have been blocked out by our Supreme Court. But this
argument assumes that such a UN court (or other agency) will have power to construe Article 17. This is a delicate contention for the United States to make, in

view of the rigid opposition of the American Bar Association to an International
Court of Human Rights or to any UN agency with power to investigate violations
of the Covenant except the International Court of Justice at the Hague.1 8 The
Hague Court would hardly have many cases under Article 17, and so the meaning
of a blanket limitation would remain obscure for years.
The persistent refusal of our government to accept as a fait accompli the overwhelming decisions of the Sub-Commission and the Conference against a blanket
limitation in Article 17 may win an improbable success in the end, but meanwhile
17

7

supra note 65, at iI.
73 A. B. A. REP. 360, 422-428 (1948). REPoir
LAUTERPACHT, op. Cit.

To [A.B.A.]

CoMP AAxvE LAW BY COMMITrE oN UNITED NATIONs 2, 8.

SECTON OF INTERNATIONAL AND
(Sept. 5, 1949.)
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our opposition to every sort of specific limitations puts us in a weak position to
influence the content of any particular specific limitation. The man who declares
that he will never eat shellfish does not have much say as to how the lobsters shall
be cooked. Two excellent opportunities to get rid of the Indian amendment, at
Geneva and subsequently, were lost because our government was unwilling, in
return, to abandon its die-hard stand for a blanket limitation.

X
SHOULD TIE SPEcIFIC LIMITATONS BE PHRASED BROADLY OR NAUROWVLY?
As soon as the Sub-Commission decided to insert specific limitations in Article

x7, we were confronted with a dilemma.
On the one hand, if we drew these limitations broadly, we might enable some
tyrannical government of a signatory nation to punish desirable discussion without
any possibility of being called to account for violating international obligations.
There would be much less scope for interference with the press than under the
blanket limitation already described, but still considerable abuses of governmental
power might conceivably occur unless we demarcated the boundary of each limitation with precision so as to make it coincide exactly with the correct line between
suppression and proper laws against speech.
The risk of abuses was especially serious in the first two limitations. The permission to control the disclosure of vital state secrets might be used by arbitrary
officials to prevent newspapers from telling citizens what these officials were doing,
and the permission to punish incitement to violent revolution could be stretched, as
history shows, to embrace prosecutions for rather mild hostile criticisms of the
policies and actions of the men in high places.
On the other hand, our tentative efforts to draft each limitation so as to cover
desirable laws and nothing else ran us at once into great difficulties. For one thing,
the precise boundary between good speech and bad speech in any area cannot be
stated briefly. Courts have had to prick out the line by the process of inclusion and
exclusion through a long series of decisions. To take the least controversial limitation-how could the Sub-Commission set out the whole existing law of libel
and slander in one clause of one article of the Covenant on Human Rights? The
danger that some legislature might repeal the defense of fair comment and thus
cripple newspapers from expressing unfavorable opinions about officeholders and
candidates had to be balanced against the fact that if the Sub-Commission undertook
to deal with the details of defamation, it would spend the fortnight of its session on
this point alone and Article 17 would read like a chapter of the Restatement of Torts.
Remember, too, that the libel laws of over fifty countries would have to be mastered
and reconciled. Even the Geneva Conference, with much more time and manpower
at its disposal, shrank from such a colossal task, and referred it to a committee of
jurists or an international organization. 79 All the other limitations, if narrowly
" See Resolution 25, FiNAL. Acr or UN CONFERENCE

ON FREmoM oF INFORMA'TON 32-33.
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phrased, would require a similar knowledge of comparative law. And even if the
Sub-Commission succeeded in writing out with precision and accuracy the best
existing conceptions about various restrictions on speech and press, we could not
hope to allow for future developments. After all, the Covenant is intended to endure
a long time. It cannot be given the exactness of an Income Tax Act for the next
fiscal year.
In choosing the broad horn of the dilemma, the Sub-Commission was swayed
by two further considerations, one relating to implementation and sanctions and
the other to the express safeguards which we were putting into Article 17.
XI
IMPLEMENTATION AND SANCTIONS

It was important to frame the promises in Article 17 so they would not only be
signed by many nations, but also kept after they were made. For that, they must
be the sort of promises which a nation will be ashamed to violate. A breach of a
treaty cannot be readily penalized like the breach of a private contract. Any external
sanction necessitates some sort of cumbrous procedure like diplomatic representations, protests to a UN agency, a suit in an international court, economic pressures,
and at the worst war. Here again the Sub-Commission was hampered by the
failure of the Human Rights Commission to follow Lauterpacht's advice ° and say
how the limitations we were drawing were to be enforced. We do not yet know
what implementation will be provided for the Covenant on Human Rights s ' but,
so far as Article 17 is concerned, it seems unlikely that whatever international sanctions are thus established will be very effective in checking governmental breaches
of the right of freedom of expression if those breaches occur very frequently or if
they are caused by a strong feeling in the particular country that the treaty obligation endangers public safety. Recall the attitude of our own Southern states
toward the Fifteenth Amendment. For forty years they ignored it with impunity.
Consequently, unless Article 17 allows room for a nation to adopt reasonable
restrictions against utterances of an objectionable nature, its provisions may be little
more than a pious hope. In a matter like this, it is unwise to induce a government to tie its hands very tightly. The result may be simply that it will untie them
at any early opportunity when other nations will not care enough to raise a peep.
When Hider moved troops into the Rhineland in 1936, he violated the German
treaty of peace with the United States. Yet President Roosevelt did nothing. No
politician or editor, so far as the writer recalls, suggested that our government should
See note 77 supra.
For a summary of the various implementation proposals in 1948, see Documents for Study in the
r949 Series of Regional Group Conferences of the American Bar Association, pp. 64-69. See also on
80

implementation, REPoRT oF TnE SECOND SEssioN oF =HECosmsssioN o N HUMAN RiGrrs (E/6oo, pp.
65-71); REpoRT oF THE Tmpam SEssioN (E/8oo, p. 36); REPoRT OF THE FiFM SESSIoN (E/1371, pp.
11-22,

61-xoo).
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do anything. That was a far greater wrong than a violation of Article 17. If
Ruritania, let us say, punishes an editor of a Ruritanian newspaper for suggesting that
its Parliament is composed of nincompoops, will the governments of the United
States, Great Britain, and France be more active than they were in x936? The
Rhineland march shows how undependable external sanctions can be.
Therefore, it is very important to place as much reliance as possible upon what
Dicey calls internal sanctions.8 2 The Sub-Commission had to draw up the kind
of promise which most good citizens within a country will want to carry out because they believe it to be a fair and desirable promise. One ought to take it for
granted that the states which adhere to this Covenant will be countries with a
reasonable amount of democratic government and devotion to personal freedoms of
all sorts. Perhaps this assumption is mistaken, but, if so, measures from outside short
of war are not likely to accomplish much in upholding Article 17 or any other
article in the Covenant. Many other freedoms besides freedom of the press are
likely to go by the board in a totalitarian state. Twelve men at Lake Success and
a piece of paper cannot do very much to prevent a strong government from breaking
promises which both its officials and its people intensely dislike. In short, the
whole Covenant rests largely upon willingness to obey.
XII
ExPRiss SAiEGUARDS

The internal sanctions just described are the principal safeguard against abuses
of broad limitations in Articles 17, but the Sub-Commission relied greatly on two
other safeguards which it expressly wrote out in the text of this article and to which
it devoted much thought and care.
A. Elimination of peacetime censorship
The first safeguard was the unequivocal repudiation of censorship of the press
and of newsreels in paragraph 3 of the Sub-Commission draft (see Appendix II,

Draft A). Even if a publication fell under one of the specific limitations, e.g.,
advocacy of violent revolution or crime, it could only be punished but it could not
be censored. (This provision would be suspended in war or a public emergency by
virtue of Article 2). Since governmental censorship is the most powerful means
of controlling and stifling public opinion, as Chief Justice Hughes pointed out in
Near v. Minnesota,s3 the Sub-Commission regarded the elimination of peacetime
censorship as one of its most notable achievements. The vote was ten to two; the
minority comprised the Soviet and Czech members.
To the writers's great regret, the Geneva Conference struck out this prohibition
of censorship. Since this action was supported by officials in Washington, although
2

" A. V. DICEY, INTRoDuucroN TO THE STUDy OF THE LAW Or THE CoNST1TUTrN 77-79

1915).

83 283 U. S. 697 (1931)-

(8th ed.
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not by the United States delegation at Geneva,8 4 the restoration of this provision

by the Human Rights Commission seems unlikely. This difference in attitude
toward censorship between the Sub-Commission and the Conference was a sign of
worsening international feeling after the Czech coup detat. It was a conspicuous
example of the tendency of the Conference, already mentioned, to plan the Covenant for the present troublous situation s5 The partial recognition of censorship in
the American Convention on the Gathering and International Transmission of
News"' was given in debate as a reason for not eliminating censorship entirely, but
to the writer this argument was unsound because the Convention was intended to
go into force as soon as possible whereas the Covenant ought to be designed for
the better days to come.
B. The rule of law
The second safeguard valued by the Sub-Commission appears in its draft of the
opening portion of paragraph 2, preceding the list of specific limitations:
Penalties, liabilities or restrictions limiting this right may therefore be imposed for
causes which have been clearly defined by law ...
The very important clause in italics originated with the Czech member, Sychrava, a
student and associate of Masaryk.
This means that not even punishment or damages can be imposed for an utter-

ance within a specific limitation unless the legislature of the particular country has
passed a law clearly defining the wrong, or unless (as in the case of libel) the wrong
has been solidly established by judicial precedents. For instance, a statute saying
merely that it was a crime to disclose "matters which must remain secret in the
vital interests of the state" would not comply with this safeguard. The statute must
define the particular kind of state secret which it is a crime to reveal. There are
now several Acts of Congress fulfilling this requirement. A fortiori,an official cannot justify his going after a publication by merely saying that it falls within a
specific limitation. He must be able to point to a specific statute condemning such
a publication.

No doubt, governments may conceivably abuse their powers under the specific
limitations, but this cannot happen unless the legislature has plainly sanctioned such
an abuse of power by a majority vote. Officials are prevented from running on the
loose. The Sub-Commission relied on public opinion within each nation as a safeguard against misuses of the legislative power to create undesirable new kinds of
criminal publications and speech within the limitations in Article 17.
Unfortunately, the Conference has seriously weakened this safeguard. In an
attempt at brevity, it made the provision read "penalties, liabilities or restrictions
" In view of the attitude of the government in Washington, the United States abstained from
voting on the censorship issue, but the writer spoke in Committee IV in favor of retaining paragraph 3
of the Sub-Commission draft.
"5 See page 549 supra.
" Art. 4.

See FINAL AcT OF UNITED NATIONS CoNFERENCE oN FREEDOM OF INFoRmATION 8.
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clearly defined by law .. ." It is not enough to demarcate the punishment if the

wrong itself be left vague. The Conference draft would permit a statute to impose
a penalty of five years for the disclosure of "any matters which ought to remain
secret in the interests of national safety."
Thus there are strong reasons why the Human Rights Commission should consider this point carefully. It is to be hoped that the Commission will restore the
wording used by the Sub-Commission.
As Article 17 now stands, the only assurance against abuses of the specific limitations lies in the internal sanctions described.
XIII
THE INDIAN AMENDMENT

Something might be said about the seven limitations drafted by the SubCommission and somewhat modified by the Conference, but these caused no serious
controversy within these bodies.8 7 Although they have been attacked in the
American press, it can easily be demonstrated that every one of the seven substantially
describes either Acts of Congress passed by heavy majorities or time-honored
restrictions under state statutes and judge-made rules.
The situation is entirely different for the eighth amendment, which was added
by the Geneva Conference as proposed by the delegation from India, after a more
sweeping Polish proposal of the same general nature had been rejected. The Indian
amendment allows a signatory state to impose penalties, liabilities, or restrictions
with regard to(h) The systematic diffusion of deliberately false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples and States.
John B. Whitton of Princeton, in his very interesting article on the Geneva Conference, thinks that, in opposing this amendment, the United States Delegation
showed itself unhealthily allergic to legal obligations as regards propaganda. Whitton writes :8

This was a modest proposal; it did not purport to cover all war-mongering or subversive propaganda, but only that based on false or distorted reports ... [Actually] the
only effect of this amendment would be to add one more to the long list of restrictions
85

The limitation as to state secrets was widely phrased by the Sub-Commission, so as to include crop

reports, lists of persons on relief, and other matters not related to national safety. The Conference, by
narrowing the limitation to secrets affecting national safety, increased the number of desirable laws for

which there is now no provision in the specific limitations.

The Conference wisely changed the copy-

right limitation, because France and some of her nations do not regard copyrights as property. The
concluding phrase in clause (g), was inserted, at the writer's suggestion, to take care of tortious nondefamatory language, such as slander of title and disparagement of the quality of goods. See s ZESMuAtt
CuAFEE, JR., GovERNMENT AND MAss ComamumexAoNs c. 6 (1947). The phrase is rather obscure and

should perhaps be omitted; the wrongs in question could then be handled like other omitted matters
of comparatively slight importance.
8" Wmsrros, The United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information and the Movement Against
International Propaganda,43 Am. J. INT'L L. 73, 86-87 (1949).
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already accepted at the Conference by states most devoted to the right of freedom of
information . . . [To] cite Professor Hocking:8 9
...
[A] cautious extension of penal law to deal with the most flagrant abuses of
public confidence would be an increase of freedom for the legitimate press. To clear
the highways of drunken drivers is not to limit but to increase the liberty of drivers who
are not drunken."
A limitation is not just "one more" when there is no precedent in American
common law or legislation for such a restraint on the discussion of important public
questions. In this and other respects, the Indian amendment is wholly unlike the
seven types of familiar restrictions allowed in the Sub-Commission draft. The only

thing comparable to it in the United States is a few recent statutes against defaming
racial or religious groups, of doubtful constitutionality and still more questionable
wisdom. Indeed, the objections to group libel laws are much the same as those
against the Indian amendment. These are presented elsewhere by the writer in a
book which also discusses the difficulties of a still closer proposal, that legislation
should be enacted to punish all sorts of inaccurate statements in the press which
have harmful consequences, for instance, to good feeling among nations. 0 Rather
than repeat the arguments there made, three reasons against the Indian amendment
will be briefly stated.
First, lawmakers should be very reluctant to create novel crimes in the area of
speech and press when it will be hard for the jury or other tribunal to distinguish
between guilt and innocence. Neither Mr. Whitton nor Mr. Hocking seems aware
of the great difficulties of proof in such cases. Since the proposal says "false" reports
shall be punished, it is easy to assume that true reports will be left alone, but the
trouble is that there is no litmus paper or yardstick to tell what is true and
what is false. We never know that a statement is really false, but only that the
tribunal decides it is false. Experience with suppressive statutes like the Espionage
Act shows that juries and judges sometimes call political discussions false because
they dislike what is said. Yet it is really a matter of differences of opinion. Nor can
you take it for granted that only sensational papers will be prosecuted. The New
York Times can cause great resentment by a calm dispatch. Moreover, where international controversies are involved in the prosecuted publication, the expense of
getting evidence on a large scale from abroad and the language barriers make an
accurate and dispassionate determination of what really happened almost impossible.
It is a task for a historian and not for a law court.
So Mr. Hocking's analogy of punishing drunken drivers is not at all in point.
The line between being drunk and not being drunk is familiar to ordinary men
and can be established by eye-witnesses or, if necesary, by blood tests. Contrast
the case of any report in a newspaper of nation A which is unfavorable to nation
B in a period of strained relations, and hence can be readily held to undermine
80 WILLIAm
0 CHEE,

E. HocKiNc, FREEDom OF THE PRESS IN AMERIcA 20 (Leyden Inaugural Address,
op. cit. supra note 87, c. 5 (on group libel), c. 7 (on inaccuracies generally).

1947).
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friendly relations between peoples. The only issue left is truth or falsity. Witnesses
must be brought over hundreds or thousands of miles to tell about the event in
question. What they say will be warped by their national prepossessions either
way, and the ultimate decision comparing the report with their testimony will be
warped by the national prepossessions of the court or jury.
Second, such a law is not likely to do any good to offset this danger that it will
suppress desirable discussion. In arguing against the Indian amendment at Geneva,
the writer tried to avoid delicate ground by devising two imaginary countries which
have such a statute-Looking-glass Country and Cloud-Cuckoodom. A newspaper
in Looking-glass Country prints a dispatch from its correspondent in Cloud-Cuckoodom, that this nation is preparing death-dealing bacteria for use against Lookingglass Country. The government of Cloud-Cuckoodom denounces the report as
false, and invokes the law. The peoples of both nations take violent sides. If the
publisher is prosecuted in Looking-glass Country, he will almost surely be acquitted.
If, instead, the correspondent is unilucky enough to be caught and tried in CloudCuckoodom, his condemnation is just as certain. In neither event, will the people
of the other country be convinced that the verdict was correct. It will be denounced
as a travesty on justice in one nation and hailed in the other nation as a conclusive
demonstration of its own claims. This controversy will drag on for years, and
meanwhile the relations between the two countries will be made worse, not better,
by the prosecution and its outcome.
The Indians felt that such a law might be of use in India or Pakistan to restrain
Mohammedan newspapers from inciting pogroms against Hindus or vice versa,
but this view presupposes governments of great integrity unswayed by local opinion;
and in any event this is too isolated a situation to justify a treaty provision authorizing such a law in countries anywhere. It would be much better to omit mentioning
it in the Covenant, and then, if India or Pakistan wants this sort of statute, it could
be handled under the provision for unmentioned limitations which was discussed
earlier in this article.
Finally, it seems highly probable that the main effect of the Indian amendment,
if promulgated, would be to serve as a talking-point for the Soviet bloc. Every
time "false and distorted reports" are mentioned in a UN document, they are constantly trying to push the thing farther and farther. They denounce anything unfavorable to them as "false and distorted," and seek to solidify what ought to be
heartfelt moral obligations of truthfulness and accuracy into legal obligations which

other countries are excoriated for not enforcing. Put those words into the Covenant,
and their chief consequence will be to multiply tedious interruptions of important
concrete tasks by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. Before doing this, the Human Rights
Commission ought to find very strong possibilities of fruitful accomplishment in the
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Indian amendment. In view of what has been said above, such possibilities are far
from obvious.
Article 17 raises still other problems, such as the desirability of inserting moral
obligations to promote freedom of informaton ° 1 into a legally binding treaty and
the question of freedom of speech for foreigners in the final paragraph added at
Geneva. 2
Enough has been said, however, to show the legal difficulties encountered by the
Sub-Commission and the Conference, and the thought which was devoted to their
solution. There is nothing here of the glamour which is often supposed to surround
international affairs. But world government, like city or state or national government, is not glamorous. It is often tedious. Only through hard work and untiring
patience is it possible to turn into facts our ideals of the way men ought to live
together, at home or abroad.
APPENDIX I

Tentative Drafts of Article 17 in Second Session of Commission on Human Rights, 194793
Draft i. Text proposed by the Drafting Committee.
i. Every person shall be free to express and publish his ideas orally, in writing, in the
form of art or otherwise.
2. Every person shall be free to receive and disseminate information of all kinds, including facts, critical comment and ideas, by the medium of books, newspapers, oral
instructions or any other lawfully operated device.
3. The freedoms of speech and information referred to in the preceding paragraphs
of this Article may be subject only to necessary restrictions, penalties or liabilities with
regard to: matters which must remain secret in the interests of national safety; publications intended or likely to incite persons to alter by violence the system of Government,
or to promote disorder or crime; obscene publications; (publications aimed at the suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms); publications injurious to the independence of the judiciary or the fair conduct of legal proceedings; and expressions or
publications which libel or slander the reputations of other persons.
Note: Although the Report does not so state, the writer has been told that this was a
British draft. Lord Dukeston (U.K.) was chairman of the Working Group on the
Covenant. Without knowing the exact significance of the parentheses around "pub-'
lications aimed at the suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms," the
writer assumes that the Working Group considered this limitation on freedom of information to be more dubious than the others. Light on this draft may probably be obtained
from two documents which give the views of the members of the Working Group: its
Report0 4 and the summary records of its meetings.0 5
Draft 2. Draft Proposed by the Representative of the United States (Mrs. Roosevelt).
Every one shall have the right to freedom of information, speech and expression.
Every one shall be free to hold his opinion without molestation, to receive and seek
0 Par. 4 of Sub-Commission draft and Par. 3 of Conference draft (see Appendix II). This was
proposed in the Sub-Commission by Pertinax, the member from France.
' 2 For the views of the Sub-Commission and the writer on this subject, see E/CN. 4/80, pp. 5-7.
"E/6oo, Dec. 17, 1947, P. 34.
O'E/CN. 4/56.
O'E/CN. 4/AC. 3/1 to 9. See E/6oo, p. 7.
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information and the opinion of others from sources wherever situated, and to disseminate
opinions and information, either by word, in writing, in the press, in books or by visual,
auditive or other means.
Note: The absence of limitations in this draft article is a natural consequence of the
wish of the Representative of the United States for one overall limitation article rather
than spelling out every possible limitation in each article 6 This problem is discussed
by the writer, supra pages 570-574.
APPENDIX II

Three Significant Drafts of Article

1707

Draft A, by the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press, Jan.-Feb.
1948.0

Draft B, by United Nations Conference on Freedom of Information, Geneva, Mar.-Apr.
I948-P9

Draft C, submitted by the Representative of France at Fifth Session of the Commission
on Human Rights, May-June 1949.100

Note: The author has indicated by italics portions of the Conference Draft which differ
from the Sub-Commission Draft. He has italicized the entire French Draft, which differs
from both the others.
A
Sub-Commission
i. Every person shall have
the right to freedom of
thought and expression
without interference by
governmental action: this
right shall include freedom
to hold opinions, to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers, either orally, by written or printed
matter, in the form of art,
or by legally operated visual or auditory devices.

B
Geneva Conference
x. Every person shall have
the right to freedom of
thought and the right to
freedom of expression without interference by governmental action; these rights
shall include [rest as in A].

C
French Draft
i. Speech is free. Every
person shall be free to express and publish his ideas
in any way he chooses.

The right to freedom of
expression carries with it
duties and responsibilities.
Penalties, liabilities or re-

z.The right to freedom of
expression carries with it
duties and responsibilities
and may, therefore, be sub-

3. The freedoms referredto
in the preceding paragraphs may be subject only
to the restrictions,penalties

2.

2.Every person shall be
free to receive and disseminate information of all
kinds, including facts, critical comment and ideas, by
the medium of books,
newspapers, oral instructions or in any other manner.

"' E/6oo, p. 37.
SThe Conference Draft is reprinted in REPoRr OF THE FsFrm SEssION OF -ItnECoMMIss rONoN
HumAN RIGHTS, June 23, 1949 (E/r37x, pp. 35-36). There are a few typographical changes. Arabic
numbers are not in parentheses, small letters preceding subdivisions of paragraph 2 are not italicized,
and the first word of each subdivision is not capitalized. "Government" is capitalized in subdivision
(b) and "states" is not capitalized in subdivision (h). In paragraph 4, "article" is capitalized. An
obvious error in subdivision (b) of the Commission's version is the substitution of "invite" for "incite."
In (a), the Commission mistakenly says "interest."
" REPORT op Tm SacoND SEssIoN oF Tm SuB-CoMmissIoN, Feb. 6, 1948 (E/CN. 4/80, pp. 4.5).
05
FINAL Acr OF m CONFERENCE, ANNEX B, pp. 19-20.
o REPORT OF FssarH SEssIxo OF CommilssioN, June 23, 1949 (E/1371, p. 34).
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strictions limiting this right
may therefore be imposed
for causes which have been
clearly defined by law, but
only with regard to:

ject to penalties, liabilities
or restrictions clearly defined by law, but only with
regard to:-
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or liabilities provided by
law for the protection of
public order, national security, good morals, respect
for law and the reputation
or rights of other persons.

A
(a) matters which must remain secret in
the vital interests of the State;
(b) expressions which incite persons to alter
by violence the system of government;
(c) expressions which directly incite persons to commit criminal acts;
(d) expressions which are obscene;
(e) expressions injurious to the fair conduct of legal proceedings;
(f) expressions which infringe rights of literary and artistic property;
(g) expressions about other persons which
defame their reputations or are otherwise injurious to them without benefiting the public.
Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a
State from establishing on reasonable terms
a right of reply or a similar corrective
remedy.

B
(a) Matters which must remain secret in
the interests of national safety;
(b) Expressions [rest as in A);
(c) Expressions [rest as in A];
(d) Expressions [rest as in A];
(e) Expressions [rest as in A];

A
3. Previous censorship of written and
printed matter, the radio and newsreels
shall not exist.
4. Measures shall be taken to promote the
freedom of information through the elimination of political, economic, technical and
other obstacles which are likely to hinder
the free flow of information.
[Immigration problems are covered by a
Note in the Sub-Commission's Report.]

B
[Paragraphon censorship struck out.]

(f) Infringements of literary or artistic

rights;
(g) Expressions about other persons natural or legal which defame [rest as in
A],
(h) The systematic diffusion of deliberately
false or distorted reports which undermine friendly relations between peoples
and States;
A State may establish on reasonable
terms a right of reply or a similar corrective remedy.

3. [Same as 4 in A].

4. Nothing in this article shall be deemed
to affect the right of any State to control the
entry of persons into its territory or the
period of their residence therein.

